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I.  Introduction 
The Great Depression was a world-wide phenomenon – few, if any, countries 
were unscathed.  There was considerable variation across countries in the extent to which 
economic activity collapsed, however, and in the timing and pace of economic recovery.  
Similarly, while all U.S. states suffered, the extent to which per capita income declined 
during the contraction, and the pace and extent to which per capita income rose during 
the recovery, varied considerably across states.  In general, states that entered the 
Depression with relatively low per capita incomes tended to suffer larger percentage 
declines in per capita income than did high income states.  During the recovery, however, 
states that had experienced relatively large income declines tended to have larger 
percentage gains.  Hence, state per capita incomes diverged during the contraction phase 
and converged during the recovery phase. 
This paper investigates the sources of interstate variation in per capita income 
growth during the contraction and recovery phases of the Great Depression.  Countless 
studies have used nationally aggregated data to examine the Depression as a 
macroeconomic phenomenon.  By contrast, few studies have examined differences in 
state economic performance during the Depression.  The considerable difference in 
economic performance across states, however, suggests that a complete understanding of 
the forces causing the Depression and bringing about recovery requires a disaggregated 
approach. 
Many of the studies that consider regional differences in economic performance 
during the Great Depression focus on employment.
1  Others have sought to explain 
                                                 
1  This literature has focused on whether interstate differences in employment growth were due to 
differences in industrial composition or other regional characteristics.  Wallis (1989), for example, 
constructed annual state-level indices of non-agricultural and manufacturing employment for 1930-40, and 
estimated that industrial composition can explain only about 40 percent of state-level variation in 
employment during the decade.  By contrast, Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (1999) focus on regional 2 
interstate differences in bank or farm failure rates.
2  We are unaware, however, of studies 
that examine differences in per capita income growth across states during the 
Depression.
3
By contrast, several studies have examined differences in state income growth 
rates since World War II.  Studies have considered whether differences in state growth 
rates can be explained by differences in industrial composition, various public policies, 
cultural and ethnic differences, the influence of pressure groups, and banking conditions.
4  
This literature provides a framework for our study of differences in per capita income 
growth during the 1930s.  Our specific hypotheses, however, are motivated by prior 
research on the Great Depression. 
The macroeconomics literature on the Great Depression attaches considerable 
importance to monetary and credit forces.  Although not universally accepted, many 
scholars agree with Friedman and Schwartz’s (1963) assessment that the Great 
Depression was a “tragic testimonial” to monetary forces.  Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963) argue that the decline in economic activity was the result of banking panics and 
misguided monetary policy that caused the stock of money to fall.  Bernanke (1983) 
                                                                                                                                                 
differences in employment growth in several specific manufacturing industries over a longer period.  They 
conclude that regional differences in industrial composition and differences in trend employment growth 
explain most of the regional variation in manufacturing employment growth during the Great Depression. 
See Heim (1998) for a survey and discussion of differences in economic performance across industries, 
regions and nations during the Great Depression. 
2   See Wheelock (1995) and Rucker and Alston (1987) on interstate differences in bank failure and farm 
failure rates, respectively. 
3   Annual estimates of state per capita incomes for 1929-39 were produced in the 1950s by Schwartz and 
Graham (1956) using various industrial censuses and other sources of data for specific industries and 
income components.  In the absence of consistent annual state-level data on income components, Schwartz 
and Graham (1956) resorted to interpolation between census benchmark years.  Thus, annual variation in 
personal income estimates across states reflects variation in both benchmark year income levels and in the 
related series, such as employment, used to derive annual estimates of the various components of state 
income.  We have no reason to believe that the annual income estimates fail to convey accurately the true 
variation across states in personal income growth during the 1930s, but these estimates are undoubtedly not 
as reliable as estimates for more recent years.  Appendix 1 summarizes Schwartz and Graham’s (1956) 
construction of state personal income estimates.  We use a slightly revised version of the original estimates 
available from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis:  “State Personal Income 
1929-99 CD-ROM.” 
4   See Crain and Lee (1999) for a survey of this literature and new empirical evidence. 3 
contends that bank failures and other financial disruptions also increased the cost of 
credit intermediation.  He finds that bank failures had a significant impact on aggregate 
output apart from their impact on the money stock.
5  Bank failure rates varied widely 
across states during the Great Depression, and we examine whether these differences 
contributed significantly to differences in state economic performance.
6
In contrast to monetary and credit forces, the macroeconomics literature has 
concluded that government fiscal policies had little to do with the Great Depression.  
Federal income tax hikes in 1932 and later years were perverse, but as a percentage of 
gross domestic product (about 3.5 percent), Federal Government receipts were low and 
changed little during 1929-33.  The Federal deficit did increase somewhat between 1934 
and 1940, but Romer (1992) concludes that fiscal policy contributed “almost nothing” to 
recovery from the Depression.  Her estimates of fiscal and monetary policy multipliers 
suggest that a much larger increase in the deficit would have been required to have had 
much impact on aggregate spending.
7
Although the stance of fiscal policy under President Roosevelt was not strongly 
expansionary, New Deal programs did distribute large sums of money to state and local 
governments for public works, payments to farmers, and other forms of relief.  
Researchers have sought to estimate the impact of New Deal jobs programs on 
employment (e.g., Fleck, 1999) and New Deal spending on local economic activity.  
Fishback, Horrace and Kantor (2004), for example, investigate whether New Deal 
                                                 
5   The literature on the role of monetary forces in the Great Depression is enormous, with important 
contributions from Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Temin (1976), Eichengreen (1992), Romer (1992), and 
others.  The role of credit and other financial frictions in the Depression is examined by Bernanke (1983), 
Anari, Kolari, and Mason (2003), and others, and is surveyed by Calomiris (1993). 
6  Several studies conclude that differences in banking conditions and regulation have contributed 
significantly to differences in state income growth since 1970.  For example, Jayratne and Strahan (1996) 
find that deregulation of state branch banking laws during the 1970s and 1980s had large and lasting effect 
on state per capita income growth rates.  Similarly, Samolyk (1994) finds that in financially-distressed 
regions, local banking-sector conditions can explain a high percentage of state income growth rates during 
1983-90.   
7   See also Brown (1956) and Peppers (1973). 4 
spending affected retail sales at the county-level.  They estimate that retail sales increased 
by about 44 cents for each additional dollar of public works and relief spending in a 
county.  By contrast, county-level retail sales declined with increased payments to 
farmers under Agricultural Adjustment Act programs.  We follow the approach of 
Fishback, Horrace and Kantor (2004) to investigate whether New Deal spending patterns 
help explain differences in state per capita income growth rates during the recovery phase 
of the Great Depression. 
The following section describes patterns in state per capita income growth during 
the contraction and recovery phases of the Great Depression.  Section III discusses 
hypotheses about why per capita income growth rates differed across states during the 
Depression.  Section IV describes our estimation methods.  Section V presents estimation 
results, and Section VI concludes.   
II.  Patterns in State Per Capita Income Growth, 1929-1939 
Table 1 lists states in order of their percentage decline in nominal per capita 
income during 1929-32.
8  It also lists the level of state per capita income in 1929 and the 
percentage increase in per capita income during 1933-39.  Massachusetts had the smallest 
decline in per capita income during 1929-32 at 32 percent, while North and South Dakota 
had the largest declines, both 56 percent.  In general, states with smaller per capita 
income in 1929 tended to suffer larger percentage declines in income during 1929-32.  
States with relatively high income per capita in 1929, e.g., New York, California and 
Connecticut, by contrast, experienced relatively small income declines.  This pattern was 
                                                 
8  We focus on changes in nominal income rather than real (constant-dollar) income throughout this study 
because of a lack of aggregate price data for individual states.  The National Bureau of Economic Research 
dates the business cycle peak in the third quarter of 1929, and the trough in the first quarter of 1933.  
Hence, using annual data, we consider 1929-32 to be the contraction phase of the cycle and 1933-39 to be 
the expansion phase.   5 
reversed during the recovery phase, when low income states tended to have larger 
percentage income gains than high income states.   
The divergence of state per capita incomes during 1929-32 was at odds with the 
long-run tendency of state per capita incomes to converge.  Between 1880 and 1980, the 
standard deviation of the log of per capita personal income fell from 0.54 to 0.15.  Over 
this one hundred year period, state per capita incomes converged at an average rate of 
about 2 percent per year, according to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), and convergence 
occurred in nearly every decade.
9  The decade of the 1920s was an exception, suggesting 
that the forces causing divergence in per capita incomes during the contraction phase of 
the Great Depression may have been in place during the prior decade.   
Regional patterns in per capita income growth during the contraction and 
recovery phases of the Great Depression are evident in Figures 1 and 2.  In general, states 
experienced growth rates that were similar to their immediate neighbors.  During the 
contraction, agricultural states in the Midwest, Great Plains and South Central regions 
tended to have large percentage declines in state per capita incomes, while states along 
the Atlantic Coast tended to have relatively small percentage declines.  During the 
recovery, states in the upper Midwest and Plains tended to have large percentage income 
gains, while states in the Northeast generally had smaller increases.  
III.  Hypotheses 
We investigate the sources of state per capita income growth during the 
contraction and recovery phases of the Great Depression.  We test hypotheses motivated 
by leading macroeconomic explanations of the Great Depression and studies of 
differences in state per capita income growth since World War II.  We begin with the 
                                                 
9   Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) distinguish between “σ” and “β” convergence, with the former referring 
to a decline in the standard deviation of per capita income across states, and the latter referring to the speed 
of convergence as estimated by the coefficient estimate on initial period per capita income in a regression 
of the percentage change in per capita income on initial income and perhaps other variables. 6 
basic empirical model of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), which estimates the speed at 
which the per capita incomes of states or regions converge by regressing the percentage 
change in per capita income on per capita income in the initial period and a limited 
number of control variables.  We augment the Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) model to 
test hypotheses that are specific to the Depression, including the effects of bank failures 
and government spending. 
That states within the same region often have similar per capita income growth 
rates is not surprising.  Neighboring states tend to have similar climate, geography, 
settlement patterns, etc., that lead to concentration in the same income-producing sectors.  
Hence, neighboring states may experience similar changes in per capita income because 
they have the same leading economic sectors.  A sector-specific shock, e.g., a large 
decline in agricultural prices, will have a larger impact on states with dominant 
agricultural sectors, which tend to be located near one another, than on states which 
derive relatively little income from agriculture.  Hence, sector-specific shocks can give 
rise to regional patterns in income growth. 
Other types of shocks can produce regional patterns in state income growth that 
are unrelated to concentration in specific income-producing sectors.  Obviously, a war or 
a natural disaster can affect income growth regardless of source, and thereby introduce 
similarities in state income growth within regions that are unrelated to industrial 
concentration.  In our econometric model of state per capita income growth we include 
both a measure of concentration in specific income-producing sectors and regional 
dummies as explanatory variables.   
To capture the impact of aggregate shocks that affect groups of states differently, 
depending on the concentration of state economic activity in particular sectors, we 7 
include a variable used by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) in their income growth 
regressions: 
9
,, 1 log( / )/ it ij t T jt j t T j Sy y ω −− = ⎡ = ⎣ ∑ i T ⎤ ⎦
                                                
      ( 1 )  
where (ωij,t-T) is the ratio of earnings (income) in sector j to total earnings in state i at time 
t-T, and yjt is the national average of personal income per worker in sector j at time t.  A 
state will have a larger value of S the more its income is derived from sectors that are 
experiencing rapid income growth nationally.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) find that S 
can account for the divergence of state per capita incomes during the 1920s.  We include 
S to investigate the extent to which aggregate shocks to particular sectors explain 
differences in state per capita income growth rates during the Depression.  
Whereas our industry structure variable, S, and regional dummies control for 
aspects of state income growth associated with aggregate shocks and location, we also 
explore whether a state’s income growth was influenced by income growth in 
neighboring states.  A decline in per capita income in one state may have a negative 
effect on the per capita incomes of neighboring states because of commuting patterns, 
trade flows, etc.  Just as one corrects for autocorrelation in time series data, consistent 
and efficient estimation of cross-sectional data requires testing and possibly correcting 
for spatial correlation (Anselin, 1988).  Our models allow for the possibility of spillovers 
(spatial dependence) in per capita income growth, and, in some specifications, for 
unobserved spatial dependence present in the error structure.
10   
Monetary and financial forces play a major role in many macroeconomic 
explanations of the Great Depression.  For example, Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 
300) write that the contraction was a “tragic testimonial to the importance of monetary 
 
10  Observed and unobserved spatial dependence have been found in the cases of state budgets and 
expenditures (Case, et al., 1993), county lottery sales (Garrett and Marsh, 2002), state tax policy 
(Hernandez, 2003), and agricultural production (Marsh, et al., 2000). 8 
forces.”  In their view, the Great Depression was caused by a collapse of the money stock 
which in turn was caused by banking panics and errant Federal Reserve policy.  Focusing 
on the recovery phase, Romer (1992, p. 757) argues similarly:  “Nearly all of the 
observed recovery of the U.S. economy prior to 1942 was due to monetary expansion.” 
Whereas Friedman and Schwartz (1963) focus on the impact of banking panics on 
the money stock, Bernanke (1983) contends that bank failures also depressed economic 
activity by disrupting credit flows.  Bank failures sever lending relationships and thereby 
increase the cost of intermediation.  Bernanke (1983) reports regression evidence that 
during the Great Depression bank failures exerted a significant independent influence on 
aggregate U.S. output growth apart from the effect of changes in the money stock.   
We investigate whether differences in the extent of banking distress contributed to 
differences in the growth of state per capita incomes.  A federal prohibition on interstate 
branch banking and restrictions on branching within many states left the banking systems 
of most states populated by large numbers of small, undiversified banks.   The fortunes of 
such banks were closely tied to income growth in their home market.  Sharp declines in 
commodity prices and agricultural incomes wiped out hundreds of small farming 
community banks in the 1920s (Alston, Grove and Wheelock, 1994).  Further declines 
probably caused many bank failures in the Great Depression, as stressed by Temin (1976) 
and others who contend that bank failures were largely a result of, rather than a cause of, 
the Depression.   
The incidence of bank failures varied widely across the United States during the 
Depression.  Rhode Island had no bank failures between 1929 and 1932, and Maine (0.50 
percent), Vermont (0.60 percent), and New Hampshire (0.60 percent) all had low average 9 
failure rates.
11  At the other extreme, Nevada had an average failure rate of 16.5 percent, 
though most of its failures were associated with the collapse of a single banking chain in 
late 1932 (Doti and Schweikart, 1991, pp. 115-23).  Other states with high failure rates 
included South Carolina (15.5 percent), Florida (14.9 percent), and Arkansas (14.8 
percent).   
Bank failure rates typically were higher in states that experienced larger declines 
in per capita income.  The correlation between the percentage change in state per capita 
income and the average annual bank failure rate during 1929-32 is −0.39.  Falling 
borrower income increases the likelihood of default and ultimately of bank failure.  
However, as stressed by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Bernanke (1983), bank 
failures might themselves depress economic activity through the destruction of deposits 
and lending relationships.  Wicker (1996) finds that banking panics in 1930 and 1931 
reduced private expenditures in the cities where failures were concentrated, though he 
finds little evidence of direct impacts elsewhere.  We test whether differences in bank 
failure rates contributed to differences in per capita income growth during the 
Depression, but use an instrumental variables approach to take account of the two-way 
causality between failures and income. 
Finally, we investigate whether state government expenditures affected the 
growth of per capita income during the Great Depression.  Crain and Lee (1999) study 
state income growth during the period 1977 to 1992.  During this period, Crain and Lee 
(1999) find that an increase in state expenditures relative to state personal income 
reduced per capita income growth.  We test whether the growth of state per capita income 
was similarly affected during the Depression.  Conceivably, a high level of state 
                                                 
11   We report the annual average failure rate, which is the ratio of banks suspended within a year to the 
number of operating banks at the beginning of the year.  10 
government expenditures might cushion the effects of falling private expenditures on per 
capita income.  The influence of state government expenditures on income growth in this 
period is especially interesting given the large increases in state tax rates, tax bases, and 
expenditures that occurred during the 1930s relative to earlier decades.
12  
Our empirical investigation of the contraction phase of the Great Depression 
focuses on the effects of sector concentration, spatial patterns, banking distress and state 
government expenditures on the growth of state per capita income.  For our study of the 
recovery phase, we also consider the impact of Federal Government expenditures.  
Brown (1956) and Peppers (1973) argued that Federal Government fiscal policy, as 
reflected by the high-employment budget deficit, was not significantly expansionary 
during the recovery period.  Romer (1992) also concludes that fiscal policy had little to 
do with the recovery.   
A recent study by Fishback, Horrace and Kantor (2004) finds, however, that New 
Deal expenditures had a significant impact on private spending at the county level.  
Fishback, Horrace and Kantor (2004) regress county-level retail sales growth on per 
capita public works and relief spending, per capita spending under the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act (AAA), state fixed effects, and a variety of control variables.  They use 
an instrumental variables model to control for the possibility that New Deal spending was 
targeted toward economically-distressed counties.  The study finds that spending on 
public works and relief increased retail sales, whereas AAA spending had an ambiguous 
effect.
13   
  We take a similar approach to investigate the impact of New Deal expenditures 
on the growth of state per capita incomes during 1933-39.  Like Fishback, Horrace and 
                                                 
12  See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1995). 
13  Fleck (1999) uses a similar approach to study the effects of New Deal work-relief hiring programs on 
county-level unemployment rates. 11 
Kantor (2004), we use an instrumental variables approach to control for the extent to 
which New Deal spending targeted states that had experienced especially large declines 
in income. 
IV. Estimation Methodology 
We estimate the percentage change in state per capita incomes during the 
contraction and recovery phases of the Great Depression separately.  Our model is similar 
to that of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).  For the contraction phase, we regress the 
change in per capita income on the level of per capita income in 1929, Barro and Sala-i-
Martin’s (2004) industry concentration variable (S), four regional dummy variables, a 
measure of bank failure, and the ratio of state government expenditures to state income in 
1929.
14  In addition, we test for spatial relationships in per capita income growth between 
states.  
Our bank failure variable is the annual average rate of bank suspensions during 
1929 to 1932.
15  We use an instrumental variables approach to control for the impact of 
declining state incomes on bank failure rates.  The variables used to instrument for bank 
suspensions are shown in the top portion of Table 2, and reflect aspects of banking 
market structure and regulation that have been used to explain interstate differences in 
bank failure rates during the 1920s and 1930s (Wheelock, 1993; 1995).  These include a 
measure of average bank size in 1929 (Deposits per Bank, 1929), the number of national 
                                                 
14 The states included in each of the four regions are:  Northeast – NH, PA, MA, ME, NY, VT, CT, RI; 
South – FL, MS, GA, NC, AL, TN, TX, VA, AR, WV, MD, KY, LA, OK, DE, SC; Midwest – MI, ND, 
SD, MO, WI, IL, NE, OH, MN, IA, KS, IN; West (omitted) – CO, MT, CA, NM, UT, WA, OR, NJ, NV, 
AZ, ID, WY.   Our industry concentration variable (S) is calculated using earnings from the following ten 
industries: Farm, Agriculture Services, Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation & Public 
Utilities, Wholesale & Retail Trade, Finance & Insurance & Real Estate, Services, and Government. 
15  Bank suspensions are defined as banks closed on account of financial difficulty.  Suspended banks are 
not necessarily closed and liquidated by bank regulators, as discussed by Anari, Kolari, and Mason (2003).  
Data on the closure and liquidation of state-chartered banks are not available, however, and most studies 
use suspension data.  We also considered the average ratio of deposits in suspended banks to deposits in all 
operating banks as a measure of bank failure.  The correlation between this variable and the bank 
suspension variable is 0.853, and including the ratio of deposits in suspended banks instead of bank 
suspensions produced nearly identical regression results. 12 
banks divided by the number of all commercial banks within a state (Percent National 
Banks, 1929), the percentage of a state’s bank deposits held in national banks (Percent 
Deposits in National Banks, 1929), the minimum capital requirement imposed on state 
banks (Minimum Capital, 1929), and the percentage of the state population living in rural 
areas (Percent Rural Population).
16
For the recovery years 1933-39, we regress the percentage change in state per 
capita income on New Deal spending, industry structure (S), per capita income in 1933, 
the ratio of state expenditures to state personal income in 1932, and four regional dummy 
variables.
17  We use income data from 1933 and 1939, rather than 1929 and 1932, in 
constructing the industry structure variable for the expansion phase.  As in the contraction 
phase regressions, the expansion phase regressions also account for spatial effects.  The 
New Deal spending variable is the annual average of per capita New Deal spending 
(loans plus grants) over the period 1933 to 1939.
18   
Economic historians have sought to explain the distribution of New Deal 
expenditures across states.  Several studies have noted a positive correlation between a 
state’s per capita income and the amount it received in Federal Government expenditures 
under the New Deal.  Wright (1973) found little evidence that either low income or high 
unemployment affected the amount of New Deal spending a state received, and that 
instead a measure of “political productivity” could explain a high percentage of the 
allocation of Federal expenditures across states.  Later studies, surveyed and extended by 
                                                 
16  We also included the independent variables listed at the top of Table 2 in the first stage regression.  
Hausman tests reveal mixed evidence of simultaneity between bank failures and the change in per capita 
income, depending on specification.  To be conservative, we instrument for bank suspensions in all 
specifications presented in the paper, though our results are qualitatively similar if the bank suspension rate 
is not instrumented.  The Hausman test results are available upon request. 
17  State expenditure data are not available for 1933.  We included the average bank suspension rate for 
1929-32 as an explanatory variable in a preliminary regression for 1933-39 to test whether income growth 
during the recovery was affected by banking distress during the contraction.  This variable was 
insignificant in all expansion phase regressions, however, and we elected to not include it in our final 
results. 
18  We thank Price Fishback for providing these data. 13 
Wallis (1998; 2001) and Fleck (2001), found that both political and economic 
considerations were important determinants of New Deal spending patterns.  Using 
county-level data on expenditures, Fishback, Kantor and Wallis (2003) also find that 
while political considerations were important, the major New Deal relief programs were 
responsive to the goals of relief, recovery and economic reform. 
In testing whether Federal Government spending affected state per capita income 
growth during the recovery phase of the Great Depression, we use instrumental variables 
to control for the possibility that New Deal spending was to some extent influenced by 
income growth.  In doing so, we follow Fishback, Horrace and Kantor (2004), who 
investigate the impacts of New Deal expenditures on economic activity at the county 
level.  Our instruments for New Deal expenditures are similar to those used by Fleck 
(1999) and Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor (2004), and are listed in the bottom panel of 
Table 2.
19  They include the average of the Democratic vote share in each presidential 
election from 1896 to 1932 (Percent of Democratic Votes), the standard deviation of the 
Democratic vote share from 1896 to 1932 (Standard Deviation of Democratic Votes), 
average voter participation in each presidential election from 1896 to 1932 (Voter 
Participation), Federal land as a percent of a state’s total land area in 1930 (Percent 
Federal Land), and the percent of a state’s population that belonged to a church in 1926 
(Percent Church Membership).
20  Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the 
analysis are shown in Table 2. 
                                                 
19  Hausman tests for simultaneity between per capita income growth and per capita New Deal spending 
were mixed, depending upon specification.  To be conservative, we follow Fishback, Horrace and Kantor 
(2004) and instrument for New Deal spending in all specifications presented in the paper.  We initially 
included a dummy variable for Nevada in the first stage regression of New Deal spending because spending 
per capita in Nevada was about $50 higher than in any other state.  While the coefficient on this variable 
was positive and significant, neither the fitted value for New Deal spending nor the second stage results 
were affected significantly by the inclusion of the dummy.  Hence, we did not include the dummy in 
obtaining our final results. 
20 Voting data are from the U.S Census Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, 
church membership data are from the U.S. Census Religious Bodies, 1926, and Federal land information is 14 
  We estimate the following model separately for the contraction phase and 
expansion phase of the Great Depression: 
yXW y α βρ ε =+ + + i      (2) 
where y is the percentage change in per capita personal income and X is the matrix of 
independent variables listed in Table 2 (state subscripts i are suppressed).  Spatial 
correlation in the dependent variable (termed a ‘spatial lag’) is captured by the coefficient 
ρ, under the hypothesis that a change in per capita income in state i is correlated with 
changes in per capita income in neighboring states.  Ignoring spatial correlation in the 
dependent variable, if present, can result in inconsistent coefficient estimates (Anselin, 
1988).  The  (NxN) spatial weights matrix, W, is specified to capture the effect of a 
change in per capita income in state i that results from a change in per capita income in 
bordering state l.  Specifically, the elements of our weights matrix W =   are defined 
as   where w
* {} il w
* / il il l il ww w =∑ il = 1 if observations i and l (i≠l) share a common border and 
wil = 0 otherwise (Cliff and Ord, 1981; Anselin 1988).  Because the spatially lagged 
dependent variable is endogenous by construction, we instrument this variable along with 
the bank suspension and New Deal spending variables.  We follow the literature and use 
spatially lagged independent variables (WX) as instruments for the spatially lagged 
dependent variable (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998, 1999; Hernandez, 2003). 
We also model spatial dependence in the error structure of Equation 2.  Spatial 
error correlation can result from spatial heterogeneity and spatially lagged independent 
variables, and a failure to account for spatial error correlation can result in inefficient 
coefficient estimates (Anselin, 1988).  The first-order spatial autoregressive structure is 
given as: 
                                                                                                                                                 
from the Annual Report of the Commissioner of the General Land Office to the Secretary of the Interior, 
1930 and the Committee on the Conservation and Administration of the Public Domain, 1931. 15 
1 () WI W ε λευ λ υ
− =+ = −      (3) 
where ε is the (Nx1) vector of error terms, υ is a (Nx1) component of the error terms 
made up of i.i.d. random variables, W is the (NxN) weights matrix with elements W = 
defined earlier, and λ is a scalar interpreted as the unobserved spatial error 
correlation coefficient.
* {} il w
21    
  We estimate our models using the methodology of Kelejian and Prucha (1999). 
The methodology is generalized 2SLS where the spatial error coefficient, λ, is estimated 
via the generalized method of moments (GMM).  A generalized 2SLS procedure 
produces consistent estimates of the model’s parameters (Kelejian and Prucha, 1999).   
The estimation procedure has several steps.  First, we obtain fitted values for all 
endogenous variables in the system by regressing each variable on the full set of 
independent variables and instruments for their respective era (see Table 2).  The 
instrumented variables are bank suspensions and Wy for the period 1929-32, and New 
Deal spending and Wy for the period 1933-39.  The fitted values are then used in 
Equation 2, which is estimated via OLS.  For the specifications in which we consider a 
spatial error lag, we obtain the 2SLS residuals and calculate ˆ λ using the GMM procedure 
outlined in Kelejian and Prucha (1999).  Equation 2 is then pre-multiplied by ˆ () I W λ −  
and this transformed equation is estimated by 2SLS.  
V.  Empirical Results 
Contraction Phase 1929-1932 
Table 3 reports the 2SLS regression estimates for the contraction period 1929-32.  
The first-stage regression results and several alternative OLS estimates are shown in 
                                                 
21 Unlike the autoregressive parameter in a time series model, the spatial parameters ρ and λ do not 
necessarily lie between -1 and 1.  A search for values of ρ and λ is typically conducted over the interval of 
the reciprocal of the smallest eigenvalue of the weights matrix and the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue 
of the weights matrix.  See Anselin (1988). 16 
Appendix 2.  We report three sets of specifications, with Models 1 and 2 including no 
spatial effects, Models 3 and 4 including a spatial lag (with coefficient estimate ρ), and 
Models 5 and 6 including both a spatial lag and a spatial error term (with estimate λ).  
Each pair of models includes one specification with three regional dummy variables (the 
West region is subsumed in the intercept).   
For the contraction phase of the Great Depression, 1929-32, we find a  
statistically significant impact of industry structure on state per capita income growth.  
States that were highly concentrated economically in sectors that performed especially 
poorly during 1929-32, such as construction, farming, and mining, had significantly 
larger declines in income than did more diversified states.  States that were concentrated 
in sectors that performed relatively less badly, such as services, finance and 
transportation, also had smaller income declines.  Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (1999) 
found similar results in their study of state-level differences in manufacturing 
employment during the Depression.   
In addition to aggregate income shocks, our results also indicate spatial 
dependence and regional effects on state per capita income growth rates.  Model 2 
includes regional dummy variables, and our estimates suggest that states located in the 
Northeast had significantly higher state per capita income growth rates even after 
differences in industry structure, bank failure rates, and other variables are controlled for.  
Models 3 and 4 include a spatial lag term, ρ, which is statistically significant in Model 3, 
but not statistically significant when regional dummies are included in Model 4.  As a 
group, however, the regional dummies fail to add statistically significant explanatory 
power in Model 4, as indicated by the likelihood ratio test statistic of 2.878.  Finally, 
Models 5 and 6 include a spatial error term, λ, as well as a spatial lag.  Likelihood ratio 17 
tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that λ=0 in either model.  The spatial lag term (ρ) is 
positive and significant in both specifications, however, indicating positive per capita 
income growth spillovers from neighboring states.  The spatial lag coefficient reveals that 
the average state’s change in per capita personal income fell about 0.5 percentage points 
for a 1 percentage point fall in the growth rate of per capita personal income in 
neighboring (border) states. 
We find little evidence that differences in bank failure rates or in the ratio of state 
government expenditures to state income explain variation in per capita income growth 
rates during the contraction.  Although the coefficient on the average percentage of banks 
suspended is statistically significant in Model 1, the coefficient is not significant in 
specifications that include regional dummy variables or spatial effects.  We obtained 
similar results when we replaced the percentage of suspended banks with the average 
ratio of deposits in suspended banks to deposits in active banks.
22   
In sum, we find evidence in support of the hypothesis that differences in industrial 
composition contributed to variation in per capita income growth rates across states 
during the contraction phase of the Great Depression.  The greater the extent to which a 
state’s income was derived from sectors that performed especially poorly, the larger the 
state’s decline in per capita income.  We find evidence that state income growth was also 
influenced by the income growth of its neighbors.  Further, our results indicate that 
industry structure and spatial effects can account for divergence in the level of state per 
capita incomes during 1929-32.  When these variables are included in the model, the 
coefficient on the 1929 level of per capita income is negative (and statistically significant 
                                                 
22   We also obtained similar results when we treated bank failures in Florida and Nevada separately from 
those in other states.  Both states were outliers in the sense of having high average bank failure rates 
compared to their declines in state income.  Florida experienced a wave of failures in 1929 at the tail end of 
a banking crisis that began in 1926 (see Vickers, 1994), while the bulk of Nevada’s failures occurred in late 
1932.  18 
in Model 5).   Hence, industry structure and spatial effects can fully explain the positive 
correlation between the 1929 level of state per capita income and income growth during 
1929-32.  Finally, we find that differences in bank failure rates and state government 
expenditures explain little of the variation in state per capita income growth during 1929-
32.
23
Recovery Phase 1933-1939 
Our 2SLS results for the recovery phase of the Great Depression are shown in 
Table 4.  The first-stage regression results and several alternative OLS estimates are 
shown in Appendix 2.  During the recovery phase, state per capita income growth rates 
were higher in states that had lower income levels in 1933 and larger declines in per 
capita income during 1929-32.  For 1933-39, we find that both regional and spatial 
effects help explain differences in state per capita income growth rates.  As during the 
contraction phase, we find that a state’s per capita income growth was influenced 
positively by income growth in neighboring states.  The spatial lag coefficients indicate 
that a state’s per capita income growth rate increased by an average of 0.53−0.59 
percentage points in response to a 1 percentage point increase in the growth rate of per 
capita income in bordering states.   
Unlike the contraction phase, we find no evidence that industrial composition 
affected state per capita income growth during the recovery.  In contrast to 1929-32, 
when the construction and manufacturing sectors experienced considerably larger 
declines in income than other sectors, there was less variation in income growth across 
sectors during 1933-39.  Hence, differences across states in per capita income growth 
                                                 
23   Our results do not necessarily indicate that bank failures were unimportant for aggregate U.S. income 
growth.  For example, as Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue, the decline in the money stock and national 
income could have been caused by banking panics, rather than failures per se.   19 
rates were influenced little by differences in the extent to which state incomes were 
derived from specific sectors. 
By contrast, we find that differences in New Deal spending levels can help 
explain differences in state per capita income growth rates.  The higher the level of 
Federal expenditures and loans within a state, all else equal, the higher the state’s per 
capita income growth rate.  The estimated effect is statistically significant in our baseline 
specification that includes no spatial effects, as well as in the specifications that control 
for spatial effects and include regional dummy variables (Models 4 and 6).  In addition, 
the estimated coefficient is relatively stable across specifications.  Using the average of 
the New Deal spending coefficient estimates across the six specifications (0.00355), we 
calculate that a $1 increase in New Deal spending per capita within a state would result in 
a 0.355 percentage point increase in per capita income growth.  Or, a $27.19 (one 
standard deviation) increase in New Deal spending within a state would result in a 9.7 
percentage point increase in per capita income growth.
24  Our results are thus consistent 
with Fishback, Horrace and Kantor (2004), who find that New Deal expenditures had a 
positive impact on county-level retail sales.
25
VI.  Conclusion 
Per capita income fell substantially in all U.S. states during the contraction phase 
of the Great Depression.  However, the extent to which per capita income declined varied 
widely across states.  States that had relatively low per capita incomes on the eve of the 
Depression tended to suffer larger percentage declines in per capita income than high-
income states.  We find that much of this divergence in per capita income was due to the 
                                                 
24  The standard deviation of the fitted New Deal expenditure variable ($27.19) is used rather than the 
standard deviation of the actual New Deal expenditure variable ($30.68).  Annual New Deal expenditures 
averaged 14.72 percent of state personal income during 1933-39. 
25   Our empirical results are qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar to those reported here if we 
omit spending under the Agricultural Adjustment Act from our measure of New Deal expenditures, or if we 
redefine our measure as expenditures alone, rather than as expenditures plus loans. 20 
concentration of low income states in sectors such as agriculture, mining and construction 
that suffered disproportionately large income declines at the national level.  Further, we 
find evidence of significant spatial effects in that the decline in one state’s per capita 
income was larger, the greater the decline among its immediate neighbors.  Indeed, 
industrial composition and spatial effects can fully explain why states with low initial 
income suffered larger declines in income during the contraction. 
State per capita incomes converged during the recovery phase of the Great 
Depression.  In contrast to the contraction phase, differences in industrial composition 
and cross-state income spillovers explain little or no variation in per capita income 
growth across states during the recovery.  We find evidence that New Deal expenditures 
had a rather large and statistically significant effect on state per capita income growth.  
However, considerable regional variation in state per capita income growth during the 
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Change in Per 
Capita Income 
1933-1939 
South Dakota  -55.63  1  426  167.44  1 
Mississippi -55.59  2  286  56.49  24 
North Dakota  -53.93  3  382  118.49  2 
Oklahoma -52.53  4  455  57.21  23 
Michigan -50.13  5  790  80.12  5 
Kansas -50.00  6  532  52.80  27 
Alabama -49.85  7  323  51.81  29 
Arkansas -49.35  8  310  58.60  19 
New Mexico  -49.27  9  410  69.19  10 
Indiana -48.23  10  607  76.19  7 
Iowa -48.88  11  581  87.75  4 
Illinois -48.73  12  948  61.10  14 
Nebraska -48.49  13  596  45.45  37 
Ohio -48.12  14  771  59.74  15 
Tennessee -47.62  15  378  52.45  28 
Arizona -46.50  16  600  59.09  18 
Kentucky -46.31  17  393  48.78  35 
Wisconsin -46.21  18  673  54.05  25 
Idaho -46.00  19  507  92.51  3 
Washington -45.75  20  741  63.30  12 
Utah -44.65  21  551  53.69  26 
Wyoming -44.59  22  675  52.88  21 
Texas -44.47  23  479  62.26  13 
Colorado -44.16  24  634  46.18  36 
West Virginia  -44.13  25  460  49.81  33 
North Carolina  -43.67  26  332  51.44  31 
Oregon -43.26  27  668  59.50  16 
Delaware  -42.83  28 1,032  59.40 17 
Montana -42.74  29  592  78.86  6 
Vermont -42.43  30  634  45.27  38 
Georgia -42.36  31  347  51.47  30 
Pennsylvania -41.84  32  772  44.12  39 
Louisiana -41.79  33  414  58.59  20 
California -41.47  34  991  43.01  42 
South Carolina  -41.32  35  271  57.71  22 
New  York  -41.31  36 1,152  31.79 46 
Missouri -41.22  37  621  50.90  32 
Connecticut  -39.45  38 1,024  43.40 40 
Minnesota -39.40  39  599  67.86  11 
Florida -38.42  40  518  71.88  9 
New Hampshire  -37.76  41  686  34.86  44 
Maine -37.27  42  601  33.42  45 
Nevada -36.64  43  868  73.94  8 
New Jersey  -36.06  44  918  43.21  41 
Virginia -34.56  45  434  49.47  34 
Rhode Island  -34.21  46  874  28.80  48 
Maryland -33.33  47  768  42.27  43 
Massachusetts -32.34  48  906  29.52  47 
MEAN -44.07    615  59.03   
 
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “State Personal Income 1929-99 
CD-ROM.”  
 
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Contraction Phase 1929–32 
 
    
  Percent Change in Per Capita Income  -44.1  5.7  -55.6  -32.3 
      
Independent Variables      
  Bank Failure Rate (percent)  6.6  4.5  0.0  16.5 
  Industry Structure (S) – 1929  -0.168  0.010  -0.191  -0.145 
  Per Capita Income – 1929  615.21  220.94  271.00  1,152.00 
  State Govt. Share of Income – 1929  0.036  0.016  0.013  0.076 
      
Instruments for Bank Failure Rate      
  Deposits Per Bank – 1929  2,089.45  2,787.12  346.67  13,939.17 
  Percent National Banks – 1929  3.23  1.41  1.01  67.4 
  Percent Deposits in Nat’l Banks  –  1929 47.9 15.6 12.3 81.8 
  Minimum Bank Capital ($000) – 1929  22.19  14.55  10  100 
  Percent Rural Population  54.0  19.9  7.6  83.4 
      
Recovery Phase 1933–39 
 
    
  Percent Change in Per Capita Income  59.0  23.1  28.8  167.4 
      
Independent Variables      
  Average Per Capita New Deal Spending  58.30  30.68  28.86  184.70 
  Industry Structure (S)  –  1933  0.065 0.001 0.062 0.067 
  Per Capita Income – 1933  327.96  131.69  129.0  626.0 
  State Govt. Share of Income – 1932  0.075  0.033  0.028  0.161 
  Regional Dummy Variables          
      
Instruments for New Deal Spending      
  Percent  of  Democratic  Votes  45.4 15.1 23.3 93.9 
  Standard Deviation of Democratic  Votes  8.6 4.3 2.2  18.3 
  Voter  Participation  59.3 18.8 15.3 83.1 
  Percent Federal Land  14.4  24.1  0  90.0 
  Percent  Church  Membership  42.7 10.7 22.0 72.8 
Notes and Sources:  Number of observations = 48.  Sources:  Percent Change in Per Capita Income: see 
Table 1; Bank Failure Rate (number of banks suspended during year divided by number of banks operating 
at beginning of year): suspensions data are from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Banking and Monetary Statistics 1914-1941, 1943, p. 284.  Number of commercial banks is from Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, All Bank Statistics 1896-1955, 1959.  Industry Structure: see text; 
State Government Share of Income: Financial Statistics of States, U.S. Census, 1929 and Financial 
Statistics of State and Local Governments (Wealth, Public Debt, and Taxation), U.S. Census, 1932; Deposits 
per Bank and Percent National Banks:  All Bank Statistics, 1896-1955;  Minimum Bank Capital: Polk’s 
Bankers Encyclopedia, 1929; Percent Rural Population:  U.S. Census Bureau, Urban and Rural Population, 
1900 to 1990; Average per capita New Deal Spending:  U.S. Office of Government Reports, Report no. 9, 
Direct and Cooperative Loans and Expenditures of the Federal Government, 1933-1939; Percent 
Democratic Votes and Voter Participation: Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, 
series 135-186; Percent Federal Land:  Annual Report of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, 
1930, and the Committee on the Conservation and Administration of the Public Domain, 1931; Percent 
Church Membership: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Religious Bodies, 1926.  
Table 3 – Contraction Phase (1929 to 1932) – State Level Results 
 











0.472***  0.423**  0.637*** 
(3.55)  (2.20)  (2.78) 
0.553** 
(2.51) 




-0.197  -0.163  0.129 
(1.08)  (0.84)  (0.49) 
-0.126 
(0.57) 




4.01***  4.053***  4.760*** 
(7.40)  (6.37)  (6.92) 
4.312*** 
(6.57) 




-0.004  -0.003  -0.009** 
(1.11)  (0.86)  (2.14) 
-0.007 
(1.59) 




0.157  0.188 























ρ -------  -------  0.474***  0.375 





λ -------  -------  ------- 
 
------- 0.645 0.427 
Likelihood Ratio Test
2
(3) χ  
For Regional Dummy Variables 
 
-------  6.963*  ------- 2.878 ------- 4.147 
Likelihood Ratio Test
2
(1) χ  
For Ho: λ = 0 







       
48  48  48  48 
Note:  Absolute t-statistics in parentheses.  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  The coefficient on per capita income is 
ultiplied by 1,000.  ‘West’ is the omitted regional dummy variable.   First stage regression results are shown in the Appendix.  
 
Table 4 – Expansion Phase (1933 to 1939) – State Level Results 
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(1.16)  (1.27)  (1.14) 







(2.51)  (3.23)  (2.36) 







(0.88)  (0.84)  (0.92) 







(2.21)  (2.94)  (1.45) 









(0.54)  (1.27) 


























λ -------  -------  ------- 
 
------- 0.099 0.160 
Likelihood Ratio Test
2
(3) χ  
For Regional Dummy Variables 
 
------- 14.93*** -------  12.918***  ------- 13.560** 
Likelihood Ratio Test
2
(1) χ  
For Ho: λ = 0 
------- ------- ------- ------- 2.560 1.826 
             
48  48  48  48  48  48  Observations 
Note:  Absolute t-statistics in parentheses.  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  The coefficient on per capita income is 










The source for our data on state per capita income and earnings by sector is “State Personal Income 
1929-99 CD-ROM,” issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
The data for 1929-39 from this source are a slight revision of data published in Schwartz and 
Graham (1956).  This appendix summarizes the description in Schwartz and Graham (1956) of 
how annual state personal income estimates for 1929-39 were constructed. 
 
Schwartz and Graham (1956) constructed their estimates of state personal incomes from data on 
individual industries and income components.  The major components of income are wages and 
salaries, proprietors’ income, and property income, which together accounted for more than 90 
percent of total personal income during the period.  The data used to derive estimates of wage and 
salary income are more comprehensive and complete than those used to estimate proprietors’ and 
property income.  Further, among the industrial sources of wage and salary income, data on the 
manufacturing sector – the largest source – are the most complete.  Still, annual estimates are for 
the most part interpolations of benchmark data, most of which are from censuses. 
 
Data on personal income by sector at the state level include wage and salary disbursements, other 
labor income (e.g., contributions to pension plans), and proprietors’ income.  Wage and salary 
disbursements is by far the largest component, and is the only component with separate estimates 
by state for each sector.  Proprietors’ income is divided only between farm and non-farm.  
Schwartz and Graham (1956) do not explain how they allocated proprietors’ income to specific 
non-farm industries, and report that because an industry breakdown on other labor income is not 
available from the basic state data, “some special estimation was required” (pp. 54-55). 
 
Specific Information on Derivation of State Personal Income: 
 
1.  Wages/Salaries (approximately 60 percent of total personal income):  For industries covered by 
unemployment insurance (UI), state unemployment insurance reports were used to estimate 
wage/salary payments by industry for 1938-39.  Estimates for 1929-37/38 were based mainly on 
census data, with various annual series used to interpolate between census years as described 
below. 
 
Cash wages to farm laborers:  Agricultural censuses of 1929 and 1939, supplemented by annual 
surveys by the USDA on employment and wage rates. 
 
Mining:  Censuses of 1929, 1935 and 1939; interpolation based on BLS surveys and state reports 
for other years. 
 
Construction:  Censuses of 1929, 1935, and 1939; interpolation based on annual data on the value 
of construction by states.  The estimates for construction are “rather weak” (p. 78). 
 
Manufacturing:  This is the largest income-producing sector and “the most reliable component of 
estimated wage and salary disbursements by states” (p. 78).  Schwartz and Graham (1956) first 
constructed a provisional series using biennial census data and annual survey data.  The provisional 
series was derived as follows:  Wages of production workers (about two-thirds of total):  Data from  
biennial censuses of manufacturing (odd numbered years), interpolated using BLS survey data 
(1932 is the first year that state-level, as opposed to region-level, data are available directly).  
Salaries of clerical and administrative employees (one-sixth of total), pay of corporate officers, 
salaries of central administrative office personnel, and of distribution employees:  Mostly derived 
from biennial censuses of manufacturing, interpolated with survey data.  Information deemed less 
reliable or complete than data for production workers. 
 
Schwartz and Graham (1956) then adjusted the provisional series for 1929-38 using the 
relationship between the census-based series and a second series for 1939 derived from 
unemployment insurance (UI) data.  Doing so brought the provisional estimates into “statistical 
conformity with the UI-based series for the subsequent (i.e., 1939-) period” (p. 79).  Schwartz and 
Graham (1956) do not indicate the extent to which the distribution of wages across states differed 
between the provisional and final series. 
 
Wholesale and Retail Trade:  Based on census data for 1929, 1933, 1935, and 1939.  Provisional 
annual series were derived from annual BLS indexes (for which state data begin in 1932).  The 
final series was derived by adjusting the data for 1939 on the basis of independent estimates 
derived from UI data, then extrapolating back to 1929-38 as was done for manufacturing. 
 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate:  Data for banks are relatively good.  Annual data on national 
bank, and state Federal Reserve member bank payrolls were obtained from the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve.  Data for state non-Federal Reserve member 
banks came from the FDIC on an annual basis beginning in 1935 (data for earlier years were 
extrapolated back to 1929).  Data for other finance areas, insurance, and real estate were based on 
census information for 1929, 1935, and 1939, and then interpolated using various series. 
 
Transportation:  Railroads:  Separate estimates for 1930, 1938, and 1940 were based on census 
and unemployment data.  Annual data from the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Association 
of American Railroads, and other sources were used to interpolate annual estimates.  The authors 
deem these data to be “reliable” (p. 83).  Other transportation:  Various census data and 
interpolation methods, including UI data for covered industries, were used. 
 
Communications and Public Utilities:  Various data, including Bell System (AT&T) records, 
information provided by the ICC and FCC and some census data (e.g., Census of Radio 
Broadcasting, 1935) were used.   
 
Services:  Various sources, including censuses of business (1929, 1933, 1935, and 1939) and UI 
data (1938-) were used. 
 
Governments:  Federal:  Annual, state-level data are available for some agencies (e.g., Post Office) 
beginning in 1929, and later years for others (e.g., other executive agencies, 1937-).  State and 
Local:  Annual estimates were based on Department of Labor surveys and other sources. 
 
Other Industries (agricultural services, forestry, fisheries, and rest-of-world):  Various sources of 
data. 
  
Adjustments for Residence:  For the 1930s, the only adjustments were for D.C., Maryland, and 
Virginia to adjust for civilian federal government employees who work in D.C. but reside in 
Maryland or Virginia. 
 
2.  Proprietors’ Income (ranged from 17-25 percent of total personal income):  Annual data are 
considerably less reliable than for wages/salaries.  Benchmark data were often interpolated using 
data on payroll changes within each industry, i.e., “differences among states in industry-weighted 
payroll indexes are taken to indicate year-to-year changes in the relative state distribution of total 
nonfarm proprietors’ income.”  For professional services, annual state income estimates were 
derived using national income data for these services, survey information, and information on the 
number of practitioners in each state.  Business income:  National level data were allocated on the 
basis of the available data “deemed to indicate best the relative state distribution of proprietors’ 
income,” including data on sales, payrolls, number of proprietors, etc. (p. 107).  Interpolation of 
benchmark years was usually done using payroll data.  Farm income:  Annual estimates from 1929 
based on data on cash receipts and production expenses.  It appears that data from the Agricultural 
Censuses of 1929 and 1939 were the basis of state estimates, with various series used to interpolate 
estimates for individual years. 
 
3.  Property Income (ranged from 17-25 percent of total personal income):  Internal Revenue 
Service data aggregated at the national level was apportioned among states using various series.  
These include data on income reported by fiduciaries by state, first available in 1938.  State level 
data on government interest payments to individuals are available from 1932 onward.   
 
4.  Other Income Components (less than 5 percent of total personal income):  Other labor income:  
minimal data to make annual state-level estimates – appears to have been based on payroll surveys.  
Transfer payments:  various sources; good data for New Deal transfers.  Personal Contributions to 





Appendix Table A1 - First Stage Regressions:   
 
Model (3) and Model (4) in Table 3 (this working paper) 
 
Model (1) and (2) in Table 3 (JEH paper) 
 
 Instrumented  Variables 
Instruments  Bank Failure Rate  Spatial Lag (Wy) 
Constant  0.437 (1.66) 0.246 (1.60) 
Per Capita Income 1929  0.000065  (1.16)  -0.000015  (0.45) 
Industry Structure 1929  -0.189  (0.24)  0.140  (0.31) 
Govt. Share of Income 1929  0.691  (1.29)  0.0044  (0.01) 
Deposits Per Bank 1929  -0.0000106  (0.34)  0.0000023  (1.28) 
Percent National Banks 1929  -0.202***  (3.23)  0.142***  (3.87) 
Percent Nat’l Deposits 1929  -0.0044  (0.09)  -0.0847***  (3.01) 
Minimum Bank Capital 1929  0.00087*  (1.88)  0.000066  (0.24) 
Percent Rural Population 1930  0.0128  (0.15)  0.021  (0.45) 
W • Per Capita Income 1929  -0.00013  (1.62)  -0.000032  (0.68)  
W • Industry Structure 1929  2.122  (1.57)  3.846***  (4.87) 
W • Govt. Income Share 1929  0.356  (0.43)  -0.293  (0.61) 
       
R
2 0.554 0.800 
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  Absolute t-statistics in parentheses.  
Number of observations = 48. 
  
 
Appendix Table A2 -First Stage Regressions:  
 
Model (3) and Model (5) in Table 4 (this working paper) 
 
Model (3) and Model (4) in Table 3 (JEH paper) 
 
 Instrumented  Variables 
Instruments  Per Capita New Deal Spending  Spatial Lag (Wy) 
Constant  528.43  (1.46) 4.633** (2.17) 
Per Capita Income 1933  0.0427  (1.13)  0.000191  (0.86) 
Industry Structure 1933  -212.50  (0.09)  -6.861  (0.48) 
Govt. Share of Income 1933  334.28***  (3.14)  0.9446  (1.50) 
Percent Democratic Votes  7.877  (0.23)  -0.534**  (2.66) 
St. Dev. of Dem. Votes  204.99**  (2.22)  0.689  (1.27) 
Voter Participation  41.143*  (1.83)  0.168  (1.27) 
Percent Federal Land  47.072***  (3.09)  -0.031  (0.34) 
Percent Church Membership  -57.321**  (2.02)  0.071  (0.42) 
W • Per Capita Income 1933  -0.022  (0.40)  -0.0011***  (3.40) 
W • Industry Structure 1933  -8056.337  (1.54)  -53.72*  (1.74) 
W • Govt. Income Share 1933  113.548  (0.56)  2.462**  (2.06) 
       
R
2 0.778 0.759 
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  Absolute t-statistics in parentheses.  
Number of observations = 48. 
  
 
Appendix Table A3 -First Stage Regressions:  
 
Model (4) and Model (6) in Table 4 (this working paper) 
 
Model (5) and Model (6) in Table 3 (JEH paper) 
 
 Instrumented  Variables 
Instruments  Per Capita New Deal Spending  Spatial Lag (Wy) 
Constant  729.67**  (2.00) 3.600* (1.81) 
Per Capita Income 1933  0.0403  (1.17)  0.00021  (1.14) 
Industry Structure 1933  -2429.68  (1.04)  -10.439  (0.82) 
Govt. Share of Income 1933  328.76***  (3.08)  0.653  (1.12) 
Percent Democratic Votes  40.682  (1.16)  -0.321  (1.68) 
St. Dev. of Dem. Votes  153.92  (1.64)  0.0981  (0.19) 
Voter Participation  35.602 (1.48) -0.101 (0.77) 
Percent Federal Land  110.82***  (3.95)  0.0207  (0.13) 
Percent Church Membership  -102.87***  (3.50)  0.133  (0.83) 
Northeast 14.242  (0.96)  -0.0846  (1.03) 
South -1.881  (0.14)  -0.01566  (0.21) 
Midwest 23.944  (1.66)  -0.0553  (0.70) 
W • Northeast  37.315*  (1.76)  -0.0386  (0.33) 
W • South  40.461*  (1.72)  -0.0533  (0.42) 
W •  Midwest  36.023* (1.74) 0.267** (2.36) 
W • Per Capita Income 1933  0.0497  (0.66)  -0.00033  (0.81) 
W • Industry Structure 1933  -10037.82*  (1.97)  -37.81  (1.35) 
W • Govt. Income Share 1933  334.624  (1.58)  3.414***  (2.95) 
       
R
2 0.851 0.861 
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  Absolute t-statistics in parentheses.  




            
 



















Bank Failure Rate  -0.311** 
(2.23)  -------- -------- 
Average Per Capita 




Industry Structure (S) – 
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3.888*** 
(5.71)  -------- -------- 
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0.00008 
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Northeast Dummy  --------  --------  0.0093 
(0.10) 
South Dummy  --------  --------  0.0344 
(0.39) 




  0.531 0.417 0.546 
Note:  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  Absolute t-statistics in parentheses.  Number of 
observations = 48. 
 
 